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AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO TEL. 583-7141 EXT. 7919

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD
BEFORE THE
YOMIURI INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SOCIETY
AT KEIDANREN HALL, TOKYO
MARCH 16, 1979

Although this ha ll is well known as an economic forum,
I am going to refrain today from giving what might be called
an economic speech .

Instead I would like to talk about

several important aspects of United States relations

w~th

Japan, including the economic, as I see them after almost two
years on the job o
they do, it
Un~ted

~s

If these remarks have a theme, and I hope

one you have

edrd from me before -- that the

States and Japan are joined by many important elementsr

~og ether

forming a strong bond of partnership and interdepen-

dence; and that we need to be aware of the complete range and
depth of our relationsf even when our preoccupat1ons may be
~n

one particular area o

ti me of

econom~c

These recent months may have been a

trouble, but they were also a period of im-

portant progress in many areas .
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- 2 Let me begin though, with a brief review of our problems
and progress in that particular area of our relationsh i p -the economic

which has dominated the headlines and the

attentions of both governments.

We have tried very hard over

the past year to consult with each other at many levels, to
compare analyses, and to share conclusions with respect to
the numer ous economi c problems we face, in an effort to agree
on the true nature of those problems and what both sides needed
to do to solve them .

The most noteworthy recent example of

the dialogue we have maintained in this field was the very successful visit by Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal
earlier this month.

We have both recognized the need to assure that these
economic problems do not spill over to disturb our relations
i n other areas .

Or put another way, it i s clear that we must

bring to bear on our economic disagreements the spirit of cooperation and mutual endeavor that has resulted in major progress
i n those other areas .

Moreover, I bel i eve we both recognize

that we must increas i ngly look upon our economic relations in
a multilateral rather than bilater al context .

If many in the

Uni ted States are disturbed that Japan last year had a trade surplus of $11.6 bill i on with us, others have pointed out that a
more fundamental problem was represented by Japan's $26 billion
~u rplus

with the whole world.

Because of the immense size o f
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our economies, Japan and the United States have heavy
responsibilities not only to each other, but to other
nations as well.

We have attacked all of these issues vigorously and
earnestly over the past year, and I firmly believe we can
point to some important progress:

~

-- The U.S.-Japan bilateral trade account, though

still seriously imbalanced, has recently shown signs of
improvement.

It may be too early to identify a trend, but

at least the figures for the last six to seven months give
reason for hope that a more reasonable bilateral balance can
be achieved relatively soon.

For example, the United States

exported $3.9 billion worth of goods to Japan in the last
quarter of 1978, up from $2.7 billion the year before for the
same period.

The proportion of these figures representing

manufactured goods has continued to rise moderately.
there is cause for encouragement.

Thus,

At the same time we should

bear in mind the more fundamental goal of a balanced global
account.

l1l

~

--

In the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotia-

tions, Japan has agreed to reduce tariffs on a wide variety
of industrial imports and has also made important concessions

- 4 -

in the agricultural field.

Negotiations such as these are

of course never a one-way street; Japan too will benefit
from a successful MTN, both in terms of selling specific
products and, in a larger sense, in that the foundations of
a liberal world trading system will have been strengthened.

-- With respect to macroeconomic issues, notably the
responsibility we both share to promote healthy g rowth while
controlling inflation, I believe we have achieved a better
mutual understanding of what is possible and what is required;
where our analyses differ we have discussed those differences
candidly and thoroughly, and we are moving in the same direction toward the same goals .

-- In key sectoral areas we have also registered some
significant achievements in the last two years .

I have in mind

particularly steel, textiles, citrus, beef, color TVs, and
leather, where we have at least narrowed i f not eliminated our
differences.

There are other examples as well.

Much more of course remains to be done before either Japan
or the United States can be satisfied with the state of our
bilateral economic ties or our respective contributions to the
world economy.

On the Japanese side, further concerted measures

are required to make the Japanese market more accessible to
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foreign goods, not only from the United States but from other
industrialized and non-industrialized countries.

While the

fault may in part be on the . side of the seller, there is no
question but that a combination of organizational, regulatory
and psychological factors have made the Japanese market a very
tough nut to crack.

The growth and prosperity Japan has

achieved of course testify to the validity of your system.

At

the same time, I believe you would agree that just as Japanese
business expects full access to the markets of other nations
and the right to compete freely, other nations should have
equal access to your rich markets.

In this connection, I would like to mention the report
on trade with Japan recently issued by the Congressional Task
Force headed by Congressman Jim Jones.
and fair in its treatment of the issues.

The report is balanced
It is even-handed in

pointing out what both Japan and the Uni ted States need to do .
While avoiding alarmist language, the report conveys accurately
a sense of the urgency with which these difficult trade problems
are viewed.

It is an important document, and I commend it to

you for your study and consideration.

I would be remiss if I did not refer to two particular
trade problems currently demanding a good deal of our attention,

- 6 NTT procurement policies and cigarette sales to Japan,
because these issues seem to many to epitomize the difficulties outsiders sometimes face in doing business with
Japan.

NTT represents an especially difficult problem, as a
government entity whose policies have discriminated against
foreign products.

We believe American, and other foreign

suppliers should be allowed to bid and could meet many of
NTT's needs at competitive prices and with excellent quality
equipment--and that this would not impose hardship upon the
Japanese communications industry .

In the case of tobacco,

American cigarettes are subject to substantial markups imposed by the government monopoly.

While a certain price

differential would be understandable and acceptable in view
of the high quality of the product, the current situation is
somewhat excessive.

As in the case of NTT, this issue has

tended to dramatize, and to some extent exaggerate, -the problems foreigners face in

sell~ng

produc ts to Japan.

I am

aware that neither of these situations is a simple one as
seen from the Japanese perspective, but both do seem to conta~n

elements of discrimination which I hope can be removed.

I appreciate the determination your government has shown
to achieve a solution of the NTT question, and I believe success will have a very good effect on the atmosphere of our
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economic relations.

At the same time, one should frankly

acknowledge two facts:

A resolution of the NTT problem will

not mean an end to sectoral trade problems, others inevitably
will arise.

Secondly, while attention to these problems is

essential, and their resolution a major achievement, we must
bear in mind the more fundamental need for continuing joint
efforts over the long-term to reduce the current account imbalance .

Progress will perhaps be slow, and there are likely

to be frustrations, but we will have to persevere.

The need for action to restore balance to our economic
ties and restore global economic stability is by no means
confined to Japan.

The United States bears some heavy obliga-

tions of its own, notably:

:r:

--

We must control inf l ation, strengthen the dollar, and

cooperate with our major trading partners in maintaining
s tability in foreign exchange markets .

-- Related to that, we need to take still further steps
to control our energy imports; we have made some progress, but
more is required, particularly in view of recent events in Iran
and the possibility of reduced oil supplies .
buy, waste and use too much.

We continue to

We should also give renewed con-

s i deration to the idea of selling excess Alaskan oil to Japan f
which I believe makes good sense for both our countries .
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-- We need to increase the productivity of our industry,
a key measure of the strength of an economy .

Our rate of

productivity growth has been declining in recent years.

We

need to examine our tax structure to insure adequate investment in plant and equipment .
better

We should emphasize research,

workers training, profit sharing and other means to

increase our man-hour output.

~

JCQC

We need to do a better job of selling our products

abroad.

As the Japanese market has begun to open up we have

noted, as you have, that European -- and even communist
country -- sales to Japan have increased by higher percentages
than have our own, although they of course started from a much
lower base .

The U.S. government needs to organize itself more

effectively to promote exports -- and has begun to do so -and

u.s.

sively .

bus1ness needs to pursue foreign markets more aggresWe are still not sufficiently export oriented, even

though we are the biggest trading nation in the world .

Before I leave this subject, let me suggest an idea which
I have heard discussed to a certain extent on our side, and
which I believe has merit

the establishment of a joint study

group whose members, meeting frequently together, could identify
incipient problems, weigh them against our mutual objectives,
and make recommendations for solutions.

The group would be
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essentially unofficial in character, and would not involve
itself in the independent, . formal decision-making process of
either of our two governments.

It would, however, become the

locus of a virtually continuous dialogue among informed ind1viduals of both sides, in government and out, bringing to
bear the varying perspectives which political, business,
agricultural,
produce .

labor, academic and bureaucratic experience

I believe this sort of institution could be invalu-

able in developing a balanced understanding of the nature of
our economic ties, and in showing where our efforts should be
most sharply focused .

In short, I believe it could shed light

on our economic difficulties, and eliminate some of the heat
which those problems have tended to generate .
t

I commend it

you, and I intend to pursue it with my government .

But I promised that this would not be an econom1c speech "
Let me turn now to some of the other vital areas of our relationship, currently less

prominen ~

as public issues, but no less

1mportant as indicators of the state of u . s . - .Tapan relations and
what the future holds for our partnership.

While it should be
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so obvious as to need no

emphas~s,

in fact the importance

to our two countries of our political and security ties
and the broad sweep of our cooperation in other fields has
in the past couple of years been obscured by our focus on
trade balances and growth rates.

I want to redirect the

spotlight for a moment .

In the security field we have enjoyed a year of close
and productive cooperation o
shared

assumpt~ons

env~ronment

Proceeding on the basis of

and assessments concerning the security

in East Asia and the nature of potential threats,

we have worked to improve the mechanisms for our cooperation
and have taken steps to share more equitably the costs of
secur~ty

our mutual

goals

There were two particularly note-

worthy developments during the past year o
development by the
Cooperat~on

un~formed

of

wh~le

guidel~nes

services .

ta~led plann~ng

Un~ted

The first was the

States-Japan Subcommittee on Defense
for

JO~nt m~l~tary plann~ng

by our

The guidelines provide a basis for de-

within the framework of the

carefully respecting the

constraints of both countries .

Secur~ty

const~tut~onal

Treaty,

and political

- 11 The second development in the defense area to which I
would like to draw your attention ' was the decision of the
Japanese government to continue and enlarge its financial support for the maintenance of the American military presence
here.

Building on the assumption in 1977 of certain indirect

labor costs of United States forces in Japan, the Japanese
government in 1978 agreed to assume those labor costs in excess
of prevailing practice and to fund the construction of certain
badly needed new facilities as well.

The total Japanese

contribution in these two areas will come to approximately
$100 million in the next fiscal year.

I should add that these

payments do not represent the sum total of Japan's contributions to our mutual security responsibilities.

The total

value on an annual basis, including labor and facilities costs,
base rental fees, the construction of replacement facilities
as part of our ongoing base consolidation program, and other
expenses comes to some $600-$700 million.

But more important than these tangible signs of our
cooperation in the defense field is the degree to which the
United States and Japan share a common view as to the nature
of potential threats and what our respective roles should be
in meeting them.

We are satisfied with the framework the

Mutual Security Treaty provides for our cooperation: we agree
that Japan's security responsibilities within that framework

- 12 should be limited to the defense of its home territory; and
we agree that Japan should continue its efforts to upgrade
the quality of its forces so that they can more effectively
carry out that assigned role.

We have not urged Japan to

undertake regional security responsibilities, nor sharply to
increase the size of its forces.

It is noteworthy, however--

and often overlooked in the United States--that Japan has
increased its defense expenditures at an average annual rate of
8 percent over the past ten years.

While small as a proportion

of its more than $1 trillion gross national product, Japan's
defense spending in absolute terms is very substantial, placing
it sixth among the nations of the world.

In order to insure that our thinking with respect to
defense issues remains basically in parallel, it is necessary
to consult frequently, candidly and at all levels.
done this over the past several years.

But the

We have

compatibility

of our views and assessments of security questions rest

as

well on a more fundamental base, a philosophical one--the
essential similarity of the way we see the world, of the
political goals we pursue, and of the basic values they reflect.

Those shared perceptions, of the world and of our places
in it, made possible another year of extraordinary political
cooperation.

That cooperation has become more effective with

- 13 t he passage of time, and more invaluable to the United States,
as Japan has moved further along toward an international
political role more nearly commensurate with its economic
power.

I would like to sketch briefly a number of areas in

which our policies were particularly in tune and mutually
supportive.

~

-- The past year was one of notable activity and
ac complishment for both our countries in our relations with
China.

Japan and the PRC concluded the long-delayed Peace

and Friendship Treaty last fall.

In consolidating and further

formalizing Japan's relations with China, that pact undoubtedl y
will contribute to the peace and security of this region and
of the world.

This was followed in December by our agreement

for the normalization of relations with Beijing, an event which,
likewise, in my judgement should contribute significantly to
a peaceful and secure Asia .

Thus, our relations with China

have moved forward along similar tracks and at a roughly
similar pace .

I have no doubt that this will continue to be

so , as both our countries have important stakes, and undoubtedly important roles to play, in the effort China has recently
e mbarked upon to modernize its economy and its society .

I

should like to state what I hope has remained clear to all of
you, that despite normalization with the PRC, the first and
most important partner and ally of the United States in Asia
a nd the Pacific is Japan .

- 14 -- At the same time, the United States and Japan have
made clear that our expanding relations with China do not mean
that we place less importance on our respective ties with the
Soviet Union.

The United States has continued to work toward

a mutually satisfactory strategic arms limitation agreement
with the Soviet Union and, while doing what is necessary to
maintain a strategic equilibrium and counter Soviet actions
directed against our friends and allies, we have at the same
time underscored our desire to cooperate with the Soviet Union
in those areas where our interests coincide.

Although Japan's

relations with the USSR do not have a strategic component, the
same general approach characterizes Japan's relations with
Moscow.

~ihile

opposing Soviet occupation of the Northern

Territories, you pursue cooperative projects in Siberian development.

While sharing our concerns regarding Soviet political

and stra.tegic motives around the world, you seek to maintain
mutually beneficial economic ties and, insofar as possible,
correct political relations.

-- The United States and Japan also have a similar view
of the dangerous situation in Indochina, where Vietnam attempts
to consolidate its control over Cambodia, while China has sought
to demonstrate that it is capable of advancing its interests
and those of its surrogates.

Together we have taken diplomatic

steps during this period, in the United Nations and through

- 15 direct contact with the countries concerned, to prevent
hostilities from spreading and to restore peace.

We will

continue to work along these lines.

-- There are more hopeful signs from another perennial
danger spot in East Asia, Korea.

The recent resumption of

direct contacts between North and South gives cause for
encouragement, although the two sides undoubtedly remain far
apart on issues of substance.

The United States and Japan

have welcomed this new development.

At the same time, I

believe we agree that essential to any genuine reduction of
tension on the peninsula is the maintenance of the security
of South Korea.

The United States recognizes its special

responsibility in this regard and has affirmed its commitment
to the defense of the ROK.

Japan of course is not a military

ally of the Republic of Korea; it does, however, have strong
economic and political ties with that country, and a heavy
stake in its well-being and security.

Thus, healthy Japan-

ROK relations, such as now exist, contribute importantly to
equilibrium on the peninsula and a reduction of tension
there.

-- The United States and Japan continue along parallel
lines in our relations with the non-communist nations of
Southeast Asia.

We share similar interests in that region,

- 16 both seeking to contribute to the resilience and the
independence of those nations.

Our policies are not coor-

dinated, and indeed we are in some respects competitors
there.

But our approaches are complementary and our compet-

ition healthy.

We both value our relations with the countries

of ASEAN, and I am sure we both will continue to make important
contributions to the progress of that region.

~~international

-- United States-Japan cooperation in diplomacy and
affairs extends beyond East Asia.

We collabo-

rate closely and effectively in the United Nations, where our
positions on the major issues are very often alike, and we
consult as well on international political and economic issues
outside the formal purview of the United Nations.

Whether

it be in efforts to arrange aid consortia for particularly
needy countries, to exchange analvses and information on
crisis situations such as the recent one in Iran, or to consult more routinely on trends in distant regions, our record
of cooperation and coordination is probably unexcelled among
the industrialized democracies.

One other significant measure of Japan's growing
international stature, and of the heavier responsibilities
it has undertaken as its power and influence have grown, is
its participation in what has become the annual summit

- 17 meeting of the advanced industrial democracies.
the summit will take place in Tokyo.

This year

I mention it here,

rather than in my earlier discussion of our economic problems
and prospects, because this multilateral summit, like its
predecessors, is as much a political as an economic event-just as the problems of economic coordination its

part~c~pants

will address are also political issues of great magnitude.
As the host country, Japan's new leadership role will be even
more clearly evident.

Our cooperation is hardly limited to these areas I have
mentioned.

A complete listing would exhaust my voice and your

patience--as advanced industrial democracies we are, for
example, in the forefront of international efforts to deal
with problems of the environment, of resource scarcity, of
development and conservation, and the sociological challenges
of post-industrial society.

But no discourse on this general

subject would be complete without at least passing mention of
what we are

do~ng

together in the area of science, technology

and cultural exchange .

Our cooperation in science and tech-

nology is probably more productive, and advanced, than between
any other two countries.

We have important programs

unde~~ay

in space technology, nuclear energy research, medical research
and in virtually all of the physical and natural sciences .
Former Prime Minister Fukuda proposed during his visit to

- 18 Washington last May that the United States join with Japan
in a new program of energy-related research and development.
Detailed discussions are still going on and we anticipate
final agreement later this year on specific research projects,
ranging from coal liquefaction to fusion.

t·Je cont1nue to have smooth and product1ve cooperat1on
1n

t~e

nuclear energy field--a source of serious contention

only two years ago.

While we still have differing assessments

as to the proper future d1rection of nuclear energy programs,
balancing energy requirements on the one hand against our
mutual des1re to curb the prol1ferat1on of nuclear weapons
on the other, we are work1ng together toward conclusion::. ana
pol1c1es that both of us and our European partners can dccept,
and an atmosphere of cooperat1on and understand1ng has replaced the a1r of 1rnrn1nent cr1s1s wh1ch so recently ex1sted o

Cooperat1on and understand1ng go together, and

t~e

degree of understand1ng that ex1sts between our two nat1on s
and peoples desp1te the d1vers1ty of our cultural her1tage 1s
remarkable.

L1ke progress 1n other areas, th1s has not s1mply

happened of its own accord.

It 1s a tr1bute to the efforts

of many 1nd1viduals and many organizations over the years to
1nterpret our nat1ons to each other .

We must cont1nue to

work to nurture and broaden that understanding, giving this
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important intangible aspect of our relations steadily more
attention.

An especially significant achievement in this

context was the recent conclusion of a new U.S.-Japan educational exchange agreement, under the terms of which our two
countries share equally the costs of an expanded program of
exchanging scholars in a variety of academic disciplines.
We have similar agreements with other countries, but this is
one of the biggest.

It will lend still greater vitality to

our already lively and productive interchange in education,
culture and the arts.

All of these diverse activities underscore the breadth
and variety of United States relations with Japan.
partnership is as complex as it is productive.

Our

We are never

without problems in one area or another, and sometimes they
are serious ones.

By the same token, there is never an

absence of progress in one area or another, often of profound
importance to both our countries and· to the world.

In our

focus on the particularly acute problems, we have tended
to overlook the areas of progress, achievement, and growing
strength in our ties.

United States-Japan relations are robust enough to stand
the strains and tensions of the moment.

At the same time,

it is incumbent upon both sides to be alert to strains when
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they appear, and to try to eliminate their · source.

If we

do not pay attention· to what we are doing and where we are
going, there could be a gradual erosion of our partnership.
This has not happened between us, and need not if we give
our relations the attention they deserve and are willing to
exert extra effort when circumstances require.

We have

recently faced such circumstances in the economic field,
just as in the not too distant past our defense ties were
a source of serious problems.

We have made the necessary

extra commitment to find solutions to those economic
problems and to move beyond them, and I am sure we will
eventually succeed.

It is unlikely that we will ever be

without problems in the economic field, but I am confident
we will be able to handle them -- it has yet to be proven
that any problem is beyond our capacity to resolve if we work
together.

We must be careful about what we say, circumspect

in our actions, and understanding of each other's difficulties
and differences.

Finally, it is insufficient merely to list the many
examples of our cooperation, or to express confidence that
it will continue to flourish, without noting an intangible
feature of our relations which will have an increasing impact
on the shape of our ties in the years ahead--the changing
perceptions in each country with respect to the other.

- 21 Our relationship has gone through several stages during
the past thirty years, from a period of dominance by the
United States to this contemporary era of partnership.
The United States sees Japan as co-equal, a source of leadership as well as simple participation.

This perception

naturally came first in the economic area, but it is no longer
confined to that realm.

Just as Japan's vision of the role

it can and should play in the world is expanding and changing,
so the world's expectat1ons of Japanese contributions in all
fields are increasing.

As this has happened it has become

even more widely accepted in the United States that our
relations with Japan are and should and will remain the cornerstone of American policy toward Asia.

Their growing

importance on a world basis has also become more generally
acknowledged--our partnership clearly is global 1n scope.

As for Japanese perceptions of the Un1ted States, I hope
that if we appear at times troubled, we nontheless continue
to be regarded as a constant friend, steadfast in our commitments and in our pursuit of fundamental goals; a worthy partner
if no longer an always dominant influence.

As the idea of

equality in our relations becomes more widely accepted in
both our countries, the possibilities for creative, productive
collaboration will grow; more and more areas of potential
cooperation will be identified; the psychological basis for
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effective cooperation will be strengthened; and the
immense importance of this relationship to both our countries, to Asia and to the world, will be even more obvious
than it is today.

Important differences in our respective roles will of
course remain, as will some differences in our goals and
our perceptions--we are, after all, very different countries.
It is the task of all of us not to eliminate differences,
but to continue to bridge them and to insure that insofar
as possible our will and our capacities remain joined
together.

In that way we can accomplish f ar more for o u r

o'¥n people 1n d t or the world than
achieve alone .

e i t~er

of us could hope to

The relations between the United States and

J apan are one of the most constructive influences of this
age.

I am convinced that they wi ll also prove among the

most durable.

*

*
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CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENT IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS
Although this hall is well known as an economic forum,
I hope you will not be disappointed if I refrain today from
giving what might be called an economic speech.

Instead I

would like to talk about several important aspects of United
States relations with Japan, including the economic, as I see
them after more than a yea-r- and a half on the job.

-± am go1ng

If these remarks have a theme, and I hope they do, it is one
you have heard from me before -- that the United States and
Japan are joined by many important elements, together forming
a strong bond of partnership and interdependence; and that
we need to be aware of the complete range and depth of

our ~~

relations, even when our preoccupations may be in one particular
area.

These recent months may have been a time of economic

trouble, but they were also a period of important progress in
many areas.

Let me begin though, with a brief review of our problems
and progress in that particular area of our relationship -the economic

which has dominated the headlines and the

attentions of both governments.

We have tried very hard over

the past year to consult with each other at many levels, to
compare analyses, and to share conclusions with respect to

-
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the numerous economic problems we face, in an effort to agree
on the true nature of those problems and what both sides needed
to do to solve them.
The most noteworthy recent example of the
d~a~ogue we have maintained in this field was the very successful
v1s1t by Treasury Secretary Blumenthal earlier this month .
We have both recognized the need to assure that these economic
problems do not spill over to disturb our relations in other
areas.

Or put another way, it is clear that we must bring

to bear on our economic disagreements the spirit of cooperation
and mutual endeavor that has resulted in
in those other areas.

~

major progress

Moreover, I believe we both recognize

that we must increasingly look upon our economic relations in
a multilateral rather than bilateral context.

If many in

the United States are disturbed that Japan last year had a
trade surplus of more than $12.6 billion with us, others have
pointed out that a more fundamental problem was represented
by Japan's $26 billion surplus with the whole world.

Because

of the immense size of our economies, Japan and the United
States have heavy responsibilities not only to each other, but
~~~~~
toA~~~e~w~u~r~id~.

We have attacked all of these issues vigorously and
earnestly over the past year , and I firmly believe we can point
to some important progress:

-
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-- The U.S.-Japan bilateral trade account, though still
seriously imbalanced, has recently shown signs of improvement.
It may be too early to identify a trend, but at least the
figures for the last three to four months give reason for
hope that a more reasonable bilateral balance can be achieved
relatively soon.

For example, the United Stated exported

---------------------billion worth of
up from
--------------------billion a

goods to Japan in January 1979,
year ago.

The proportion of

manufactured goods in those January figures also rose, from
__________________.percent in 19 7 8 to
1979.

percent in

--------------------~

Thus, there is cause for encouragement.

time we should bear in mind that

At the same

more fundamental goal of

a balanced global account.
-- In the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Japan has agreed to reduce tariffs on a wide variety of
industrial imports and has also made some important concessions
in the agricultural field.

Negotiations such as these are of

course never a one-way street; Japan too will benefit from a
successful MTN, both in terms of selling specific products and,
in a larger sense, in that the foundations of a liberal world
trading system will have been strengthened.
-- With respect to macroeconomic issues, notably the
responsibility we both share to promote healthy growth while
controlling inflation, I believe we have achieved a better

- 4 mutual understanding of what is possible and what is required;
where our analyses differ we have discussed those differences
candidly and thoroughly, and we are moving in the same
direction toward the same goals.
-- In key sectoral areas we have also registered some
significant achievements in the

~

last ~ year s .

I have in mind

particularly steel, textiles, citrus, beef, color TVs, and
leather, where we have at least narrowed if not eliminated
our differences.

There are other examples as well.

Much more of course remains to be done before either
Japan or the United States can be satisfied with the state
of our bilateral economic ties or our respective contributions
to the world economy.

On the Japanese side, further concerted

measures are required to make the Japanese market more
accessible to foreign goods, not only from the United States but
from other industrialized and non-industrialized countries .
While the fault may in part be on the side of the seller, there
is no question but that a combination of organizational,
regulatory and psychological factors have made the Japanese
marketing system a very tough nut to crack.

I do not for a

moment suggest that we in the United States have the right to
demand that Japan change its socio-economic structure overnight
or to revamp its distribution

syste~op

to bottom.

)>

-

The growth and prosperity
validity of your system.
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J~~ ~a~hieved testif,e~o

the

But I do suggest that just as you

expect full access to the markets of other nations' and the
right to compete freely, other nations should have equal
access to your rich markets.

In this connection, I commend to your attention the report
on trade with Japan recently issued by the Congressional Task
J"!M

Force headed by Congressman

~-.Jones.

It is an excellent job,

balanced and fair in its treatment of the issues, while still
conveying a sense of the urgency with which these problems are
viewed.

/-

~

;.:J- ;L>

~~ ~

f

•.A.'

~

I would be remiss 1n not mentioning two particular problems
currently demanding a good deal of our attention, cigarette sales
to Japan and NTT procurement policies.

Neither of these looms

lar ge in terms of the total volume of US-Japan trade, but they
seem to many to epitomize the difficulties outsiders sometimes
face 1n doing business with Japan.

- 5 (a) -

In the case of tobacco, American cigaretts are subject to
markups of as much as 500 percent, imposed by the government
monopoly.

A certain price differential would be understandable,

and acceptable, in view of the high quality of the product.
we believe the current situation is somewhat excessive.

But

NTT

procurement represents a different, though similar problem.
In this case foreign suppliers of communications equipment have
had to contend with what has amounted to a virtual prohibition
on outside procurement.

American, and other foreign suppliers

undoubtedly could meet many of NTT's needs at competitive prices
and with excellent quality equipment.

We are confident as well

that this would not mean ruin for the Japanese communications
industry.

I
I

I
r

As in the case of cigarettes, this issue has tended

- 6 -

to dramatize, and to some extent exaggerate, the problems
foreigners face in selling products to Japan.

I am aware

that neither of these situations is a simple one as seen
from the Japanese perspective, but both do seem to contain
elements of discrimination which I hope can be removed.
I appreciate the determination your government has
shown to achieve a solution of the NTT question, and I
believe success will have a very good effect on the atmosphere
of our economic relations.

At the same time, one should

frankly acknowledge two facts:

A resolution of the NTT

problem will not mean an end to sectoral trade problems, others
inevitably will arise.

Secondly, while attention to these

problems is essential, and their resolution a major achievement,
we must bear in mind the more fundamental need for continuing
joint efforts over the long-term to reduce the current account
imbalance.

Progress will perhaps be slow, and there are

likely to be frustrations, but we will have to persevere.
The need for action to restore balance to our economic
ties and restore global economic stability is by no means
confined to Japan.

The United States bears some heavy

obligations of its own, notably:
-- to control inflation, strengthen the dollar, and
cooperate with our major trading partners in maintaining

- 7 stabi l ity in foreign exchange markets .
Re l ated to that , to take still further steps to
c ontro l our energy imports ; we have

~
made ~ important

progress,

but more is required, particularly in view of recent events

in Iran and the possibility of reduced oil

~~

"t
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~~ ~ '( .,..,.._, L- ~ ~ ~
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·-- 11 - - To increase the productivity of our industry, a key
measure of the strength of an economy ; our rate of
productivity growth recently has declined .

We need to

examine our tax structure to insure adequate investme nt in
plant and equipment.
- - To do a b e tter job of selling our products abroad.

')

As the Japanese market has begun to ope n up we have not e d, ~·
as you have, that European

-- and even communist

countr~

sales to Japan have increased by highe r p e rcentage s tha n )
have our own, although they of course started from a much
lower base.

u.s

The ~ gov e rnment

nee ds to orga n ize itse lf more

effectively to promote exports -- and has b e gun to do so
and U.S. business needs to pursue for eign marke ts more
aggressively.

We are still not sufficiently e xport orie nted,

even though our total trade is now one -sixth o f our n a t i ona l
product.

,

\.

-

7 (a)

Before I leave this subject, let me suggest an idea which
I have heard discussed to a certain extent on our side, , and.~~~
rfvJ.-;~ ·

Which I believe has real merit-- the establishmentAof a socalled "wise men's group" to oversee our economic relations.
Such a group might include private experts as well as government
officials, and from government should include participation from
both the legislative and executive sides.

It would not be

responsible for the day-to-day management of our economic ties,
but its members, meeting frequently together, would be closely
enough involved to identify incipient problems, weigh them against
our mutual objectives, and make recommendations for solutions.
A wise men's group could become the locus of a virtually

continuous dialogue among informed individuals of both sides,
in government and out, bringing to bear the varying perspectives
which

political, ~~emic
~

and bureaucratic experience produce.

I believe this sort of institution could be invaluable in
developing a balanced understanding of the nature of our economic
ties, and in showing where our efforts should be most sharply
focused.

In short, I believe it could shed light on our

economic ties, and eliminate some of the heat which our economic
problems have tended to generate.

I commend it to you, and I

intend to pursue it with my government.

- 8 -

But I promised that this would not be an economic speech.
Let me turn now to some of the other vital areas of our
relationship, currently less prominent as public issues, but
no less important as indicators of the state of U.S.-Japan
relations and what the future holds for our partnership.
While it should be so obvious as to need no emphasis, in fact
the importance to our two countries of our political and
security ties and the broad sweep of our cooperation in other
fields has in the past couple of years been obscured by our
focus on trade balances and growth rates.

I want to redirect

the spotlight for a moment.
In the security field we have enjoyed a year of close
and productive cooperation--of the sort, I might add, that
has

become~~

for us.

Proceeding on the basis of shared

assumptions and assessments concerning the security environment
in East Asia and the nature of potential threats, we have
worked to improve the mechanisms for our cooperation and
have taken steps to share more equitably the costs of our mutual
security goals.

There were two particularly noteworthy

developments during the past year.

The first was the d e v e lop-

ment by the United States-Japa n Subcommittee on De f e ns e
Cooperation of guidelines for joint military planning by our
uniformed s e rvic e s.

The guide line s provide a b a sis for

detailed planning within
._ the framework of the Security Trea ty,
whil e care fully respecting the constitutional a nd political
constraints of both countries.

- 9 -

The second development in the defense area to which I would
like to draw your attention was the decision of the Japanese
government to continue and enlarge its financial support for the
maintenance of the American military presence here.

Building

on the assumption in 1977 of certain indirect labor costs of
United States forces in Japan, the Japanese Government in 1978
agreed to assume those labor costs in excess of prevailing
practice and to fund the construction of certain badly needed
new facilities as well.

The total Japanese contribution in

these two areas will come to approximately $100 million in the
next fiscal year.

I should add that these payments do not

represent the sum total of Japan's contributions to our mutual
security responsibilities.

The total value on an annual basis,

including labor and facilities costs, base rental fees, the
construction of replacement facilities as part of our ongoing
base consolidation program, and other expenses comes to some
$600-$700 million.
But more important than these tangible signs of our
cooperation in the defense field is the degree to which the
United States and Japan share a common view as to the nature
of potential threats and what our respective roles should be
in meeting them.

We are satisfied with the framework the

Mutual Security Treaty provides for our cooperation ; we agree
that Japan 's security responsibilities within that framework
should

be limited to the defense of its home territority;

',

- 10 and we agree that Japan should continue its efforts to upgrade
the quality of its forces so that they can more effectively
carry out that assigned role.

We have not urged Japan to

undertake regional security responsibilities, nor sharply
to increase the size of its forces.

It is noteworthy, however--

and often overlooked in the United States--that Japan has
increased its defense expenditures at an average annual rate
of 8 percent over the past t~n y~ars. While small as a
~-u.--. ~ ~~
proportion of its~gross national product, Japan's defense
l ~ - ,.

1\

I

J

spending in absolute terms is very substantial, .~fiifeunffing

.}A...t ~
mQI:fjjl..
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1 ~ ~
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~ ~
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-9 la:il.l..i:en- 4-n-ttre ur>eoming ..fi.scal-year .

In order to insure that our thinking with respect to
defense issues remains basically in parallel, it is necessary
to consult frequently, candidly and at all levels.
done this over the

..

past~year$

We have

But the compatability of our

views and assessments of security questions rests as well on
a more fundamental base, a philosophical one--the essential
similarity of the way we see the world, of the political goals
we pursue, and of the basic values they reflect .
Those shared perceptions, of the world and of our places
in it, made possible another year of extraordinary political
cooperation.

That cooperation has become more effective with

the passage of time, and more invaluable to the United States,
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as Japan has moved further along toward an international
political role more nearly commensurate with its economic
power.

I would like to sketch briefly a number of areas in

which our policies were particularly in tune and mutually
supportive.
-- The past year was one of notable activity and accomplishment for both our countries in our relations with China.

Japan

and the PRC concluded the long-delayed Peace and Friendship
Treaty last fall.

In consolidating and further formalizing

Japan's relations with China, that pact undoubtedly will
contribute to the peace and security of this region and of
the world.

This was foll owed in December by our agreement for

the normalization of relations with

~c~t~:

an event which,

likewise, in my judgement should contribute significantly to a
peaceful and secure Asia.

Thus, our relations with China

have moved forward along similar tracks and at a roughly
similar pace.

I have no doubt that this will continue to

be so, as both our countries have important stakes, and
undoubtedly important roles to play, in the effort China has
recently embarked upon to modernize its

,
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the same time, the United States and Japan have

made cle ar that our expanding relations with China do not mean
that we place less importance on our respective ties with the

- 12 -

Soviet Union.

The United States has continued to work toward

a mutually satisfactory strategic arms limitation agreement
with the Soviet Union and, while doing what is necessary to
maintain a strategic equilibrium and counter Soviet actions
directed against our friends and allies, we have at the same
time underscored our desire to cooperate with the Soviet
Union in those areas where our interests coincide.

Although

Japan's relations with the USSR do not have a strategic
component, the same general approach characterizes Japan's
relations with Moscow.

While opposing Soviet occupation of

the Northern Territories, you pursue cooperative projects in
~·;l.

Siberian development.

While sharing our .uspicions of Soviet

political and strategic motives around the world , you seek
to maintain mutually beneficial economic ties and, insofar
as possible, correct political relations.
-- The United States and Japan also have a similar view
of the dangerous situation in Indochina, where Vietnam attempts
to consolidate its control over Cambodia, with Soviet encouragement and support, while China seeks to d emons trate that it is
capabl e of advancing its interests and those of its surrogates .
We would like to see a restoration of the status quo ante in
Indochina , with a withdrawa l of Vi etnamese troop s from Cambodia
and a withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam.

- 13 -

~~
We have

taken diplomatic steps during this period, in the United

Nations and through direct contact with the countries concerned,
to prevent hostilities from spreading and to restore peace.
We will continue to work along these lines, and I believe there
is reason for confidence at least that the conflict can be
contained.
-- There are more hopeful signs from another perennial
danger spot in East Asia, Korea.

The recent resumption of

direct contacts between North and South gives cause for
encouragement, although the two sides undoubtedly remain far
apart on issues of substance.
welcomed this new development.

The United States and Japan have
At the same time, I believe

we agree that essential to any genuine reduction of tension
on the peninsula is the maintenance of the security of
South Korea.

The United States recognizes its special

responsibility in this regard and has affirmed its commitment
to the defense of the ROK.

Japan of course is not a military

ally of the Republic of Kor e a; it does, however, have strong
economic and political ties with that country, and a heavy
stake in its well-being and security.

Thus, strong Japan-ROK

ties, such as now exist, contribute importantly to equilibrium
on the peninsula and a reduction of tension there.

- 14 -- The United States and Japan continue along parallel
l ines in our relations with the non-communist nations of Southeast asia .

We share similar interests in that region, both

seeking to contribute to the resiliance and the independence
of those nations .

Our policies are not coordinated , and indeed

we are in some respects competitors there .

But our approaches

are complementary and our competition healthy.

We both value

our relations with the countries of ASEAN, and I am sure we
both will continue to make important contributions to the
progress of that region .
-- United States-Japan cooperation in diplomacy and
international affairs extends beyond East Asia .

We

collaborate closely and effectively in the United Nations, where
our positions on the major issues are very often alike , and we
consult as well on international political and economic issues
outside the formal purview of the United Nations .

Whether

it be in efforts to arrange aid consortia for particularly
needy countries , to exchange analyses and information on
crisis situations such as the recent one in Iran, or to consult
more routinely on trends in distant regions , our record of
cooperation and coordination is probably unexcelled among the
industrialized democracies.

- 15 One other significant measure of Japan's growing
international stature, and of the heavier responsibilities i t
has undertaken as its power and influence have grown, is its
participation in what has become the annual summit meeting of
the advanced industrial democracies.
~

take place in Tokyo.

This year the summit will

I mention it here, rather than

in my earlier discussion of our economic problems and prospects,
because this multilateral summit, like its predecessors, is as
much a political as an economic event--just as the problems of
economic coordination its participants will address are also
political issues of great magnitude.

As the host country,

Japan's new leadership role will be even more clearly etched .
Our cooperation is hardly limited to these areas I have
mentioned.

A complete listing would

exhaus ~

my voice and your

patience--as advanced industrial democracies we are, for
example, in the forefront of international efforts to deal
with problems of the environment , of resource scarcity, of
development and conservation, and the sociological challenge$
of post-industrial society.

But no discourse on this general

subject would be complete without at least passing mention of
what we are doing together in the area of science, technology
and cultural exchange .

Our cooperation in science and

technology is probably more productive, and advanced , than
between any other two countries.

We have important programs

underway in space technology, nuclear energy research,

- 16 medical research and in virtually all of the physical and natural
sciences.

Former Prime Minister Fukuda proposed during his

visit to Washington last May that we join with Japan in a
new program of energy-related research and development.
Detailed discussions are still going on and we anticipate final
agreement on specific research projects, ranging from coal
liquefaction to fusion, later this year.
We continue to have

smooth and productive cooperation

in the nuclear energy field--a source of serious contention only
two years ago.

While we still have differing assessments as to

the proper future direction of nuclear energy programs,
balancing energy requirements on the one hand against our mutual
desire to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the
other, we are working together toward conclusions and policies
that both of us and our European partners can accept, and an
atmosphere of cooperation and understanding has replaced the
air of imminent crisis which so recently existed.
In the cultural area as well, the past year has been
unusually productive.

An especially significant achievement

was our recent conclusion of a new Fulbright Agreement with
Japan.

Under the terms of that agreement, Japan will pay f.H.H.y

5Q~eRt,._of

the costs of our cultural exchange activities.

We have similar agreements with other countries, but few if any
are as large as this one.

It will lend still greater vitality

- 17 to our already lively and productive interchange in culture
and the arts.

The state of our relations and the plethora of

communication linking our two societies has meant that
government plays a relatively smaller role in interpreting
one nation to the other.

But that role can nonetheless be

crucial, in identifying and illuminating nascent problems and in
introducing people of influence or special insight to their
opposite numbers.

Both our governments recognize this, and

have given this aspect of our relations deservedly greater
attention.
All of these diverse activities underscore the breadth and
variety of United States relations with Japan.
is as complex as it is productive.

Our partnership

We are never without

problems in one area or another, and sometimes they are serious
ones.

By the same token, there is never an absence of progress

in one area or another, often of profound importance to both
our countries and to the world.

In our focus on the particularly

acute problems, we have tended to overlook the areas of
progress, achievement, and growing strength in our ties.
United States-Japan relations are robust enough to stand ~
strains and tensions of the moment.

At the same time, it is

incumbent upon both sides to be alert to strains when they
appear, and to try to eliminate their source.

If we do not

pay attention to what we are doing and where we are going,

- 18 -
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~ gradual erosion of our partnership is not only possible 7~~
but

Q::tia-.

not.

J This has not happened between us, and

nee~

(

We must, however, remain alert, and be willing to exert

extra effort when circumstances require.

We have recently

faced such circumstances in our economic relations, just as in
the not toodistant past our defense ties were a source of
serious problems.

We have made the necessary extra commitment

to find solutions to those economic problems and to move beyond
them, and I am sure we will eventually succeed.

It is unlikely

that we will ever be without problems in the economic field, but
I am confident we will be able to handle them -- i t has yet to
be proven that any problem is beyond our capacity working
c
tt. l ,.. LJ o _. ..vWtogether to resolve. 1 '
fl ..,..
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insufficient merely to list the many

examples of our cooperation, or to express confidence that it
will continue to flourish, without noting an intangible feature
of our relations which will have an increasing impact on the
shape of our ties in the years ahead--changing perce ptions in
each country with respect to the other.

Our relationship has

gone through several stages during the past thirty years, from
a period of

t~~ugh

dominance by the United States to this

contemporary era of partnership.

The United States

i~c~Qiai~y

looks upon Japan as co-equal, a source of leadership as well
as simple participation.

This perception naturally came

'

-
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first in the economic area, but it is no longer confined to
that realm.

Just as Japan's vision of the role it can and

should play in the world is expanding and changing, so the
world's expectations of Japanese contributions in all fields
are increasing.

As this has happened it has become even more

widely accepted in the United States that our relations with
~~
Japan are and should ~remain the cornerstone of American policy
toward Asia.

Their growing importance on a world basis has

also become more generally acknowledged--our partnership
clearly is global in scope.
As for Japanese perceptions of the United States, I hope
that if we appear at times troubled, we nonetheless continue
to be regarded as a constant friend, steadfast in our commitments
and in our pursuit of fundamental goals; a worthy partner if no
longer an always dominant influence.

As the idea of equality

in our relations becomes more widely accepted in both our
countries, the possibilities for creative, productive collaboration will grow; more and more areas of potential cooperation will
be identified; the psychological basis for effective
cooperation will be strengthened; and the immense importance
of this relationship to both our countries, to Asia and to the
world, will be even more obvious than it is today.

-
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Important differences in our respective roles will of
course remain, as will some differences in our goals and our
perceptions--we are, after all, very different countries.
It is the task of all of us not to eliminate differences, but
to continue to bridge them and to insure that insofar as
possible our will and our capacities remain joined together.
In that way we can accomplish far more for our own people and
for the world than either of us could hope to achieve alone.
The relations between the United States and Japan are one of
the most important constructive influences of this age.
am convinced that they will also prove among the most
durable.
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